This paper works towards developing a general theory of tax practice by identifying the type of individuals who provide tax services and examining the nature of the fragmented market in which they operate. The empirical studies in the tax practitioner literature have been considered with a view to determining what exactly tax practitioners do, and how they interact and deal with the persons on whose behalf they work. This is done with a view to developing a conceptual analysis of their work. Negotiation theory (Wall Jr, 1985) is then posited as a general theory which fits many aspects of tax practitioners and their work, when analysed in this way.
because they claimed the standard deduction when it was more beneficial for them to itemize. About half of these taxpayers used a paid tax preparer".
(iii) Taxpayers also desire to avoid serious tax penalties.
(iv) Taxpayers wish to reduce the likelihood of a tax investigation.
(v) The increasing complexity of the tax system also provides an incentive to employ assistance in completing a return.
(vi) Klepper et al. (1991) suggest that legal ambiguity over their type of income is a motive for some groups of taxpayers seeking professional assistance. Scotchmer (1989) suggested that resolution of uncertainty is likely to be a primary practitioner function, and this could take two forms -completing a correct return that is unlikely to be challenged by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and completing one that minimises taxes while taking into account the likelihood of a challenge.
The wish to resolve uncertainty is logically linked with attitudes towards risk. Some studies conclude that when uncertainty is increased, risk averse taxpayers will report higher levels of income. 4 Christensen and Hite (1997) found significant differences, however, in the factors that affect risk averse and risk taking individuals: risk averse individuals are influenced most by outcomes being described in terms of winning or losing an IRS challenge, whereas risk takers are more sensitive to higher probabilities of success. Tax practitioners, on the other hand, take more aggressive positions when the item under consideration is a tax deductible item rather than additional income.
In the 1980s, two studies (Yankelovich et al., 1984; US Internal Revenue Service, 1988 , Appendix B) assessing taxpayer motivation for seeking assistance, found that the key reasons were: fear of making a mistake (63% of respondents); hope that employing a preparer would save money (13%); and insufficient time to self-prepare the return (11%).
A significant amount of literature on tax, however, has centred on the "factors affecting the compliance behavior of US taxpayers" (Hite and McGill, 1992: 389) . 5 A large part of prior research considers tax compliance using a deterrence theory framework (Grasmick and Green, 1980; Tittle, 1980) . The general import is that individual taxpayers are deterred from non-compliance in accordance with their perceptions of probable detection and the severity of penalties. A considerable body of research now examines the concept of 'tax morale' and why taxpayers do actually comply (Alm and Torgler, 2004, 2006; Torgler, 2007) , which includes consideration of the behavioural aspects of tax compliance and evasion based on insights from social and cognitive psychology and behavioural economics (Frey, 1997; Kirchler, 2007) . A developing corpus of research also examines how the extent to which taxpayers trust their government or how the power their government has over them affects compliance (see the 'slippery slope framework' of Kirchler et al., 2008) . 6 There is a clear movement away from deterrence towards a developing theme of co-operative compliance between taxpayers and governments (OECD, 2013) . The general theory proposed in this paper can accommodate such changes.
Until recently, tax compliance research did not consider the likely impact of the tax practitioner on compliance. A significant body of research now finds that practitioner prepared returns are more non-compliant than those prepared by the individual taxpayer (Erard, 1990 (Erard, , 1993 Klepper and Nagin, 1989a; and Smith and Kinsey, 1987) . This means that the role of tax practitioners is very important in the compliance process, as practitioners can encourage clients to be compliant or deter them from being so (LaRue and Reckers, 1989) . The literature repeats both effects. 7 Klepper and Nagin (1989a) and Klepper et al. (1991) suggest that tax preparers' dual roles arise as a result of the complexity of tax law: they act as "enforcers" in unambiguous contexts and as "exploiters" in ambiguous ones which is supported by the findings of Spilker et al. (1999) and Hite et al. (2003) . Doyle et al.
(2012) investigated the moral reasoning of tax practitioners in social contexts and in tax contexts. Although no differences between tax practitioners and non-tax practitioners were found in ethical reasoning in social contexts, once the context changed to tax, differences in moral reasoning were significant, with tax practitioners utilising significantly lower level moral reasoning than non-practitioners.
Where a tax practitioner interprets ambiguous situations in the taxpayer's favour, rather than in favour of the taxing authority, this is referred to as being aggressive (Hite and McGill, 1992) . Several studies (for example, Ayres et al., 1989; Erard, 1993; Jackson and Milliron, 1989; McGill, 1988; Reinganum and Wilde, 1990; Westat, Inc., 1987) support the idea of levels of "aggressiveness" from tax practitioners. However, Tan (1999) , looking at predominantly small business owners in New Zealand, found that they agreed more with conservative advice given by a tax practitioner and less strongly with aggressive advice.
Studies by Collins et al. (1990) and Tan (1999) also found evidence that taxpayers aim for a practitioner who correctly prepares the tax return. Even if taxpayers are presented with an ambiguous tax situation in which their tax adviser provides aggressive or conservative advice, there is no preference for aggressive tax filing in general (Hite and McGill, 1992) , although it is agreed that there exist many opportunities for practitioners to engage in unethical activities (Marshall et al., 1998) .
Several studies 8 report on the factors affecting tax practitioners' levels of aggressiveness. These have been discovered to be: client attributes (quality of records, dependability, etc.); the preparer's own concerns about penalties; possible loss of (an important) client; opinions of others in the firm; advocacy posture; client risk preferences; levels of ambiguity in a particular issue; whether tax is due by the client; tax authority experience; probability of tax investigation; type of firm; CPA status or not; education level;
whether the decision was taken by one practitioner or a group; and ethical concerns.
Practitioners can be influenced by one or more different factors and one or more factors may operate in conjunction.
5.
A conceptual analysis of the work of tax practitioners Thuronyi and Vanistendael (1996: 148-151) identify six different functions performed by tax practitioners. Their analysis is very general and includes situations which pertain worldwide:
(i) Tax planning. This is viewed as a:
"much wider package of legal and economic services, including auditing, accounting, financial, legal and management services. Tax problems can arise not only from the company's accounts and records, but also from legal obligations flowing from company law, securities regulation, bankruptcy law, and so on.
Therefore it is important to recognise that many different kinds of professionals will deal with tax problems as a natural extension of their non-tax activities". Thuronyi and Vanistendael, 1996: 149 This analysis is important as it recognises inherently the interdisciplinary nature of tax services, which is a factor complicating attempts at analysis and regulation.
(ii) Advice ancillary to financial and other services. Entities such as banks, insurance companies and real estate companies will often provide tax advice in relation to the products that they sell. The advice will typically be narrow in scope and tailored to particular products. This is not the same as the type of services provided by more 'general' practitioners.
(iii) Preparation and auditing of commercial accounts. This is not usually done by the same professionals who would calculate any tax liability arising from commercial accounts, at least in the UK. The point which Thuronyi and Vanistendael (1996) make, however, is that the preparation and auditing of accounts, while regulated stringently by other bodies, is not regulated by tax authorities. Hence tax practitioners will be obliged to accept figures provided by others to work on, so the work of other professionals has an impact.
(iv) Preparation of tax returns. This is where taxpayers hire a practitioner to complete and submit their tax return to the tax authorities.
(v) Representation of the taxpayer before the tax administration. Here tax practitioners act as advocates on behalf of taxpayers, though, depending on the type of representation required, this may additionally or alternatively be shared with other professionals, such as lawyers.
(vi) Representation before the courts. This is not unlike category (v), but may represent a stage beyond (v), where representation before the tax authority has failed, particularly if the matter is one that may be construed as a civil matter. If the issue involves tax fraud or evasion, then the issue is likely to go straight 1988; Milliron and Toy, 1988; Newberry et al., 1993; Reckers et al., 1991; Roark, 1986; Schisler, 1994; and before the courts. Under the UK's legal system, representation at this level is likely to involve primarily members of the legal profession. Thuronyi and Vanistendael (1996) consider these different functions foremost to see whether they each require a different kind of regulation. If so, this would create a complex situation, as within an accounting firm, for example, one tax practitioner may provide several different services.
There is, however, another way of looking at the service provided by tax practitioners.
The analysis below is provided with a view to developing a general theory of tax practice.
Generally the work of tax practitioners may be categorised into two basic kinds: tax compliance work and tax planning/avoidance/mitigation advice (Frecknall-Hughes and Moizer, 1999). Tax compliance work involves the preparation of tax computations for submission on the taxpayer's behalf to the tax authorities, dealing with subsequent queries and the resolution of any uncertainties. Tax planning (or avoidance or mitigation) work occurs when the tax practitioner attempts to devise ways of reducing the taxpayer's liability to tax or maximising after-tax returns (see the paper by Gribnau in this collection). It should be said that this categorisation is not universally agreed, as many would analyse the work done into further divisions and/or sub-divisions or see certain work as comprising elements of the two basic categories of compliance or planning, though most would accept tax planning as a separate category (Stainer et al., 1997).
Tax compliance work
This involves reporting the economic events that have occurred. The aim of tax practitioners will be to ensure that the reporting of these economic events complies with tax law, but using whatever latitude is possible to present the information in the best possible Schmidt, 2001. way to serve a client's interests. Tax legislation may contain 'grey' areas, where the law is unclear, although often it is the situation to which the legislation is applied that is ambiguous.
For example, the law may be clear on the tax treatment of repairs to buildings as distinct from capital expenditure, but it may be difficult in reality to distinguish a repair from capital enhancement. Hence, if a building requires a new roof because a storm has destroyed the old roof, the new roof would inevitably contain some improvement (given advances in construction materials and techniques over time), especially if the building owner deliberately took the opportunity to install a better roof. This would make the dividing line between capital and repairs even harder to define. In such cases, tax practitioners may have some scope for creative tax reporting. In addition, there will inevitably be areas of tax reporting where the amounts to be entered in the tax returns are subject to uncertainty and hence to an overt process of negotiation with the tax authorities. Such negotiations can be considered to be a legitimate part of the tax process, because it is normal for some uncertainty to arise in particular circumstances. Typically, this will cover areas where values have to be agreed and may be the subject of differing professional opinions, such as determining the value of unquoted company shares with no stock market price, or the value of real estate.
Tax planning work
This category involves a definite and deliberate manipulation of the taxpayer's affairs to reduce the amount of tax payable. For example, in the UK, inheritance tax may be charged on an individual's death where the value of assets in the estate, or given prior to death, exceeds certain exempt bands. In order to provide some relief, gifts taking place more than seven years before death are exempt and so it is possible to avoid paying some or all of the potential inheritance tax by making lifetime transfers of assets directly to the intended beneficiaries or indirectly into trusts. Hence, it is a normal part of inheritance tax planning to devolve estates so as to preclude legitimately a tax burden occurring on death. Such tax planning involves deliberately framing reality in a particular way to ensure that taxpayers are enabled to act pre-emptively in order to obtain future benefits, which they would otherwise miss because of a lack of knowledge of the technicalities of tax law. It is also possible for tax practitioners to go further and deliberately test a tax statute, which is unclear or ambiguously written, or where issues arise which are not the subject of specific statute or case law precedent. Such testing is at the outer extremes of tax planning and may involve the establishment of complex or artificial schemes with the aim to avoid tax. In the past, these schemes have come not infrequently to the Courts for a decision as to their legitimacy. Such avoidance schemes typically use the law in complex ways and are characterised by exploitation of loopholes, a high degree of artificiality and legal and/or financial 'engineering', and while they comply with the letter of the law, they breach its spirit.
A distinction is generally drawn between avoidance of tax, which is regarded as legitimate, and evasion, which is not. The term tax evasion is usually used to mean illegal avoidance of tax, and may be achieved by a variety of means, from falsely reporting transactions which have, or have not, occurred, to setting up artificial transactions. However, the extent to which transactions may be regarded as legitimate avoidance or illegitimate evasion (and so where the dividing line may be drawn) depends on the legal, social or political climate of the time. 'Tax avoision' is a term coined (by Seldon, 1979) to describe activity, behaviour or transactions where it is unclear as to which side of a dividing line between legality and illegality that they fall, especially if one considers that taxpayers should comply not only with the letter of the law but also with its spirit.
However, in the early years of the twentieth century, avoiding tax was acceptable, with
Lord Clyde, for example, famously saying that no one was morally or otherwise obliged to enable the Revenue to "put the largest possible shovel into his stores". language. While tax avoidance remains legal, the use of the word in many official contexts, is to suggest that is it the same as evasion, which it is not.
"Customs & Excise appears now to use the term 'legitimate avoidance' to distinguish between what they clearly believe to be 'illegitimate' avoidance and 'the legitimate desire to organise affairs in a tax efficient way'. These deliberate attempts to confer an aura of illegality to a legitimate activity is dangerous, and should not be allowed to continue unchallenged."
Peter Wyman, Head of Tax at Coopers & Lybrand, 1997: 3 This approach blurs terminology and shifts this kind of behaviour (which might hitherto have been acceptable) on to morally dubious ground. In times of economic hardship, when reduced tax take adversely affects the provision of public services, this device appears to have been effective in focusing attention on the activities of multinational companies. The UK Chancellor of the Exchequer in his 2012 Budget speech specifically referred to aggressive tax avoidance as being "morally repugnant" (Krouse and Baker, 2012).
A further anti-avoidance device has been the introduction of a general anti-abuse rule (GAAR), which came into force on 13 July 2013, and is designed to provide a legal lens through which to view and judge activity without the need to put in place additional antiavoidance measures. It remains to be seen how effective it will be.
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The idea of tax planning encompasses all of the above activities -and tax practitioners will be involved in the full range.
Possible theories of tax practice
Tax practitioners deal both with their clients and the taxing authority, and are placed somewhere between the two. As shown in Section 5, practitioners undertake different types of work, some of which may actually be unsuccessful (failed planning schemes, etc.). The task remains of developing a general theory to fit these different types of work and encompass all the individuals who may perform it. There are six possible theories which have some claim to be considered -namely game theory, agency theory, exchange theory, prospect theory, stakeholder theory and finally, negotiation theory. To demonstrate the validity or otherwise of all these theories is beyond the scope of one article -and indeed, would merit several separate studies. We concentrate here on demonstrating the relevance of negotiation theory. In particular, we feel that it copes well with the complex interaction between humans, which is involved in tax practice, and, in particular, encompasses effectively the concept of tax planning work, even in instances where the planning can be rejected, or never come before a client (because unworkable), or might fail. This is not to claim that negotiation theory is the perfect underlying theory. As we acknowledge in our conclusion, there are some difficulties.
One of the best expositions of negotiation theory was developed by James Wall Jr (1985) in his book Negotiation Theory and Practice. In this he develops theory by reference to finalised, past negotiations. We follow closely Wall's theory, but develop it to show its relevance to taxation work.
Negotiation defined
"Negotiation deals with two participants who have different needs and viewpoints attempting to reach an agreement on matters of mutual interest." Martin et al., 1999: 65 and "... seeks to find an agreement that will satisfy the requirements of two or more parties in the presence of limited common knowledge and conflicting preferences. "a process through which two or more parties coordinate an exchange of goods or services and attempt to agree upon the rate of exchange for them. In this interaction, the primary objective may be an agreement or any other outcome indigenous to or resulting from the ongoing exchange."
The following diagram, Figure 1 , is a simplified paradigm of negotiation.
Insert here Figure 1 : Negotiation paradigm, developed from Wall Jr (1985: 23).
In any negotiation there will be involved a negotiator (negotiator 1 in the above figure), typically representing one or more parties (negotiator 1's constituent), as well as an opponent (negotiator 2) similarly acting on behalf of one or more parties (negotiator 2's constituent).
Each negotiator will see the other as an opponent.
In terms of a tax scenario, the negotiators are the tax practitioner (negotiator 1) and the individual tax authority figure (negotiator 2), acting respectively on behalf of a client (constituent 1) and the taxing authority (as an arm of government, constituent 2). In Figure 1 above there are six potential relationships, as indicated by the six sets of double arrows, which also indicate possible information flows or exchanges. Each party derives benefits or incurs costs as a result of interaction with other parties. The difference between benefits and costs yields a net outcome to any given party for each interaction (i.e., a trade-off). In any interaction, the benefits and costs arise from two sources -the interactions between parties as part of the on-going exchange and the agreement that results from this exchange (the process itself and the outcome of the process). This may vary according to the aims of the individuals involved. Wall Jr models the net outcome of a negotiation using algebra, and this is included in Appendix 1, for completeness.
Conclusion
We have in this paper gone some way towards developing a general theory of tax practice, taking account of all the different types of work which tax practitioners undertake and which has been identified as missing. We have examined the type of individuals at work in tax practice and have shown how the nature of the fragmented market in which they operate contributes to the lack of a holistic view being taken of tax practitioners' work. The empirical studies in the tax practitioner literature have been reviewed to determine what exactly tax practitioners do, how they interact with the persons for and with whom they work, hence to help develop a conceptual analysis of their work (tax compliance and tax planning).
Negotiation theory is then posited as a general theory fitting tax practitioners and their work, when analysed in this way. We have argued that this fits all the different types of work undertaken by practitioners, and inherently includes consideration of both private and public sector practitioners, thus providing a consistent and coherent underlying theoretical framework. Significantly the framework is capable of accommodating changes in the model of behaviour between tax authorities and their citizens, which is inherent in the newer concepts of co-operative compliance. We do not, however, claim that negotiation theory will necessarily fit perfectly all aspects of taxation work. For example, the negotiating power of a revenue authority figure in many cases may exceed that of a taxpayer or tax practitioner, and there may be a materiality threshold below which an authority figure might apply so that issues did not come to a negotiation. In addition, other theories (e.g., game theory, stakeholder theory), as mentioned earlier may also offer an alternative possibility for an underlying theoretical construct. (1985: 127) 
